Tiny Go service that returns ShellConfig JSON for any registered app.
Backs the runtime-loaded <AppShell> component being added to
@limitless/ui (next).
Endpoints:
GET /api/v1/shell/{appKey} → app + branding + user + menus, ETag-cached
GET /api/v1/apps → registered app inventory
GET /healthz, /readyz → ops probes
Auth:
Keycloak Bearer JWT validated against the gosecCloud realm.
Discovery URL is overridable so pods can hit Keycloak via the
in-cluster service (https://keycloak.keycloak.svc.cluster.local:8443)
while still validating the canonical issuer (auth.gosec.cloud).
Lazy JWKS init — pod stays up if Keycloak is briefly unreachable.
Data model (gsc_core.shell):
apps · menu_items (zone enum: topbar/sidebar/footer/user-menu) ·
menu_role_grants (Keycloak realm roles, OR semantics, empty=all) ·
branding
Seed includes the 8 gsc-crm sidebar items + topbar search +
user-menu (settings/support/logout) + footer (docs).
K8s:
Namespace gsc-shell (ambient mesh).
Deployment 2 replicas, internal-only ingress shell-api.gosec.internal,
EJBCA SERVER cert.
ServiceEntry for auth.gosec.cloud (vestigial — discovery now uses
in-cluster path; keeping for ad-hoc curl from inside pods).
Added to keycloak/allow-keycloak-clients AuthorizationPolicy out of band.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
188 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
188 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
// Package auth verifies Keycloak-issued JWTs.
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//
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// JWKS discovery is lazy: we don't hit `.well-known/openid-configuration`
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// at startup because pod-to-public-internet TLS may be slow during pod
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// boot and we don't want a healthy DB-only deployment to crash because
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// auth.gosec.cloud hiccupped. Discovery happens on first token validation
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// and the result is cached. We retry on every fresh request until it
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// succeeds.
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package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/tls"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
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"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
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)
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type UserClaims struct {
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Subject string `json:"sub"`
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Email string `json:"email"`
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DisplayName string `json:"name"`
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GivenName string `json:"given_name"`
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FamilyName string `json:"family_name"`
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TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
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Roles []string // realm roles + flattened client roles
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}
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type Verifier struct {
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issuer string // the canonical issuer claim Keycloak emits
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discoveryURL string // optional: point discovery at an internal URL
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allowedAudCSV string
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mu sync.Mutex
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v *oidc.IDTokenVerifier // nil until first successful discovery
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}
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// NewVerifier returns a Verifier that validates tokens whose `iss` matches
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// `issuer`. If `discoveryURL` is non-empty, OIDC discovery is performed
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// against that URL instead — useful when the canonical issuer is a public
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// hostname (auth.gosec.cloud) but the pod can only reach Keycloak through
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// an in-cluster service.
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func NewVerifier(_ context.Context, issuer, discoveryURL, allowedAudiencesCSV string) (*Verifier, error) {
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if issuer == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("issuer is required")
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}
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return &Verifier{
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issuer: issuer,
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discoveryURL: discoveryURL,
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allowedAudCSV: allowedAudiencesCSV,
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}, nil
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}
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// ensure resolves the underlying OIDC verifier on demand. Cached after first success.
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func (vr *Verifier) ensure(ctx context.Context) (*oidc.IDTokenVerifier, error) {
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vr.mu.Lock()
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defer vr.mu.Unlock()
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if vr.v != nil {
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return vr.v, nil
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}
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disc, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 10*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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target := vr.issuer
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if vr.discoveryURL != "" {
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// Tell go-oidc that "the issuer claim Keycloak puts in tokens" and
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// "the URL we hit for discovery" can differ — otherwise it errors
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// because the discovery doc's issuer field won't match what we
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// passed to NewProvider.
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disc = oidc.InsecureIssuerURLContext(disc, vr.issuer)
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target = vr.discoveryURL
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// In-cluster Keycloak presents a cert for `auth.gosec.cloud`, not
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// for `keycloak.keycloak.svc.cluster.local`. Ambient mesh policy
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// gates who can reach Keycloak; we don't need cert hostname
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// verification on top of that for the internal discovery hop.
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client := &http.Client{
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Transport: &http.Transport{
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TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, //nolint:gosec
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},
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Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
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}
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disc = oidc.ClientContext(disc, client)
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}
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provider, err := oidc.NewProvider(disc, target)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc discovery: %w", err)
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}
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vr.v = provider.Verifier(&oidc.Config{
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// Custom audience check below; many Keycloak access tokens have
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// aud="account" which would fail strict OIDC checks.
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SkipClientIDCheck: true,
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})
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return vr.v, nil
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}
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func (vr *Verifier) Verify(ctx context.Context, raw string) (*UserClaims, error) {
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v, err := vr.ensure(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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tok, err := v.Verify(ctx, raw)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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var raw1 struct {
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Subject string `json:"sub"`
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Email string `json:"email"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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GivenName string `json:"given_name"`
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FamilyName string `json:"family_name"`
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TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
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AzpAudience string `json:"azp"`
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RealmAccess struct {
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Roles []string `json:"roles"`
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} `json:"realm_access"`
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ResourceAccess map[string]struct {
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Roles []string `json:"roles"`
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} `json:"resource_access"`
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}
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if err := tok.Claims(&raw1); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode claims: %w", err)
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}
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if vr.allowedAudCSV != "" {
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if !contains(strings.Split(vr.allowedAudCSV, ","), raw1.AzpAudience) {
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return nil, errors.New("token azp not in allowed audiences")
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}
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}
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roles := append([]string{}, raw1.RealmAccess.Roles...)
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for _, ra := range raw1.ResourceAccess {
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roles = append(roles, ra.Roles...)
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}
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return &UserClaims{
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Subject: raw1.Subject,
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Email: raw1.Email,
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DisplayName: raw1.Name,
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GivenName: raw1.GivenName,
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FamilyName: raw1.FamilyName,
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TenantID: raw1.TenantID,
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Roles: roles,
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}, nil
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}
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func (vr *Verifier) Middleware() fiber.Handler {
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return func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
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header := c.Get("Authorization")
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if !strings.HasPrefix(header, "Bearer ") {
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return c.Status(fiber.StatusUnauthorized).
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JSON(fiber.Map{"error": "missing bearer token"})
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}
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raw := strings.TrimPrefix(header, "Bearer ")
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claims, err := vr.Verify(c.UserContext(), raw)
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if err != nil {
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return c.Status(fiber.StatusUnauthorized).
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JSON(fiber.Map{"error": fmt.Sprintf("invalid token: %v", err)})
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}
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c.Locals("user", claims)
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return c.Next()
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}
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}
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func User(c *fiber.Ctx) *UserClaims {
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if u, ok := c.Locals("user").(*UserClaims); ok {
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return u
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}
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return nil
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}
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func contains(haystack []string, needle string) bool {
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for _, h := range haystack {
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if strings.TrimSpace(h) == needle {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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